This article is a brief critique of Jonathan Edwards' views on the will and freedom. I won't be presenting the alternative view, LFW, nor will I attempt to demonstrate the logical outcomes of Edwards' view (i.e. God is the author of sin, God's offer is insincere…). Instead I will just be looking at the internal consistency of Edwards' view. I really think that the more people understand Edwards, the less they will agree with him.

Brief Outline of Edwards' view of Freedom

Brief Outline of Edwards' Arguments in Part II of Freedom of the Will
Edwards attacks LFW in two broad categories: causation and divine foreknowledge. Under causation, Edwards argues that LFW either leads to an infinite regression of causes or is an action without a cause. Edwards then argues that actions without causes are absurd because: 1) they would violate the common sense idea that nothing ever comes to pass without a cause, 2) then we wouldn’t be able to reason from cause to effect, 3) all proof of God’s existence is taken away, and 4) actions produced by a causeless cause would be both random and irrational, and therefore not a basis of moral accountability.

Infinite Regression of Causes or Causeless

In part 3, scections III.I, III.II, and III.III, Edwards argues against the link between LFW and responsibility by appealing to divine impeccability as well as judicial hardening. He argues if God cannot sin, and a hardened man cannot do good, neither has freewill. But God is still worthy of praise and the hardened sinner is still to blame. So praise and blame do not require freewill.

In part 2 section 12, Edwards attempts three demonstrations of the incompatibility of LFW and God’s foreknowledge: 1) based on the connection between foreknowledge and the event, 2) based on the impossibility of knowing things without evidence and 3) based on knowing a contingent event with certainty.

The Connection between Foreknowledge and the Event
Edwards' Argument:
P1: Things in the past are now necessary
P2: In the past, God infallibly foreknew our future choices
C1: therefore, God's foreknowledge of our future choices is now necessary
P3: if something necessary is infallibly connected with something else, that something else is also necessary
P4: God's necessary foreknowledge is infallibly connected with our future choices
C2: therefore, our future choices are necessary

My Response

Outline of Edwards’ Arguments in Part III.IV
Commands inconsistent with LFW

Outline of Edwards’ arguments in part III.V

Background - LFW and responsibility

Under LFW, we are the causal source of our choices (i.e. nothing causally predetermines our choices); we are responsible for our choices. There’s nowhere else to go to. We can’t back track to something else - we are responsible. Under CFW, since our actions are causally predetermined, we can trace back the cause of our actions to something outside of us. Thus, we keep searching for the source of our actions to find out what’s ultimately responsible. When Calvinists say God is the ultimate source, we say they make God ultimately responsible for sin. Even if God establishes a system in which only secondary causes get punished and the primary cause does not (as Calvinists suppose), that doesn’t change the fact that God is ultimately responsible for sin. The issue isn’t one of God’s power or sovereignty, it’s a matter of His goodness and holiness.

Outline of Edwards Arguments in part V.I

1. Arminians say if something causally predetermines our choices, we are not responsible.
2. But responsibility is not the cause of choices, it’s in the nature of choices
3. If responsibility is in the cause of choices, we search through an infinite regression of causes, and nothing is ever responsible.

My Response
Point 1 is close, but not quite accurate. While our actions can be predetermined, our choices cannot be. Choice cannot be predetermined, else it’s not choice. Predeterminism leaves us with only one possible action, but choice requires alternatives (i.e. more than one). A “predetermined choice” is self-contradictory, implying we can choose something we can’t choose. So we think Calvinists are inconsistent for saying we can choose.

Outline of Edwards’ arguments in part V.II

1. Arminians say that without self-determining power, we have no power of action, acts are not our own, and we must be passive.
2. This isn’t the way people use “action” in common speech.
3. Used this way action is either causeless or an infinite regression of causes.
4. When we speak of a first cause, if nothing causes something, nothing could prevent it, so therefore it is necessary.
5. The common notion of action is the effects of the will.
6. Arminians think of action as self-determination, because the motion of our bodies is caused by our wills – so they assume the same applies to the motion of our wills.

Edwards’ arguments in part V.III and part V.IV

Edwards splits necessity into two categories: natural and moral. Natural necessity relates to our actions, moral necessity relates to our wills. If an act is naturally necessary, it is either against or without our will, and whether we will or not the result is the same. Edwards says that natural necessity is the common meaning of necessity and moral necessity is philosophical. Natural necessity (common necessity) is a sense wholly different than that used in the Calvinist/Arminian debate. Most people go through their whole lives without thinking about moral necessity (philosophical necessity) and its relationship with responsibility.

Libertarian Free Will (LFW) is the idea that man is able to choose otherwise than he will choose. It’s contrasted with Compatiblism Free Will (CFW), the idea that free will and determinism are compatible. These are alternative views of the will; both can’t be true about a persons’ will at the same time.

The descriptions “libertarian” and “free” distinguish LFW from CFW, but are otherwise redundant. For those holding to LFW, the will is always at liberty, and is always free, else it’s not a will. Arminius put it: “the will cannot be forced”.

Everything is about God in one way shape or form. So my biggest problem with Edwards’ arguments regards the nature of God.

Outline of Edwards' Arguments About the Necessity of the God's Will - Part IV.VII

Please click on the attachment to view Gregory H. Harris, “DOES GOD DECEIVE? THE ‘DELUDING INFLUENCE' OF SECOND THESSALONIANS 2:11”, The Master's Seminary Journal 16/1 (Spring 2005) 75-93.

One of the questions we invariably get from Determinists is "But HOW does God know the future??" Determinists often seize upon the difficulty of understanding God's knowledge, and insist that if God didn't cause the future, then He could not have known it. Besides being a rather silly stretch, this claim requires several unfounded assumptions about the nature of God.

The Basic Views

Now before I jump in any deeper, let's define what the major views of God's knowledge in relation to free will are (this is just a basic list, variations of these views exist):

1. Determinism: God determines absolutely all that will be, making absolute foreknowledge trivial. There is no such things as libertarian free will, and our choices cannot be otherwise.

Affirms foreknowledge, but has the very unfortunate side-effect of making absolutely everything that occurs the will of God, and possibly essential to His nature, as we'll touch on below.

“Consider the words of Christ to the church at Thyatria [sic.] concerning the prominent woman referred to as ‘Jezebel’ and His servants, who were practicing immorality and pagan customs, doubtless in a religious context after the manner of the cults:

“I have a few things against you, because you allow that woman Jezebel, who calls herself a prophetess, to teach and to seduce my servants to commit fornication and to eat things sacrificed to idols. And I gave her space to repent of her fornication, and she repented not. Behold I will cast her into a bed, and them that commit adultery with her into great tribulation, except they repent of their deeds. (Rev. 2:20-22)”