This article is a brief critique of Jonathan Edwards' views on the will and freedom. I won't be presenting the alternative view, LFW, nor will I attempt to demonstrate the logical outcomes of Edwards' view (i.e. God is the author of sin, God's offer is insincere…). Instead I will just be looking at the internal consistency of Edwards' view. I really think that the more people understand Edwards, the less they will agree with him.

Brief Outline of Edwards' view of Freedom

Brief Outline of Edwards' Arguments in Part II of Freedom of the Will
Edwards attacks LFW in two broad categories: causation and divine foreknowledge. Under causation, Edwards argues that LFW either leads to an infinite regression of causes or is an action without a cause. Edwards then argues that actions without causes are absurd because: 1) they would violate the common sense idea that nothing ever comes to pass without a cause, 2) then we wouldn’t be able to reason from cause to effect, 3) all proof of God’s existence is taken away, and 4) actions produced by a causeless cause would be both random and irrational, and therefore not a basis of moral accountability.

Infinite Regression of Causes or Causeless

In part 3, scections III.I, III.II, and III.III, Edwards argues against the link between LFW and responsibility by appealing to divine impeccability as well as judicial hardening. He argues if God cannot sin, and a hardened man cannot do good, neither has freewill. But God is still worthy of praise and the hardened sinner is still to blame. So praise and blame do not require freewill.

In part 2 section 12, Edwards attempts three demonstrations of the incompatibility of LFW and God’s foreknowledge: 1) based on the connection between foreknowledge and the event, 2) based on the impossibility of knowing things without evidence and 3) based on knowing a contingent event with certainty.

The Connection between Foreknowledge and the Event
Edwards' Argument:
P1: Things in the past are now necessary
P2: In the past, God infallibly foreknew our future choices
C1: therefore, God's foreknowledge of our future choices is now necessary
P3: if something necessary is infallibly connected with something else, that something else is also necessary
P4: God's necessary foreknowledge is infallibly connected with our future choices
C2: therefore, our future choices are necessary

My Response

James Leonard provided a nice summary of Roger Olson’s book: Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities. Olson’s book is quickly becoming an Arminian classic. One of Leonard’ key points is “Arminians are not driven to their position because they want to cling to free will, as if it were absolutely precious and the one non-negotiable of the debate. The real issue for Arminians is the character of God. Arminians are driven to their position because they see that Calvinism leads to making God the author and the effecting power of sin, and denying God's goodness.” (link)

Outline of Edwards’ Arguments in Part III.IV
Commands inconsistent with LFW

Outline of Edwards’ arguments in part III.V

Background - LFW and responsibility

Under LFW, we are the causal source of our choices (i.e. nothing causally predetermines our choices); we are responsible for our choices. There’s nowhere else to go to. We can’t back track to something else - we are responsible. Under CFW, since our actions are causally predetermined, we can trace back the cause of our actions to something outside of us. Thus, we keep searching for the source of our actions to find out what’s ultimately responsible. When Calvinists say God is the ultimate source, we say they make God ultimately responsible for sin. Even if God establishes a system in which only secondary causes get punished and the primary cause does not (as Calvinists suppose), that doesn’t change the fact that God is ultimately responsible for sin. The issue isn’t one of God’s power or sovereignty, it’s a matter of His goodness and holiness.

Outline of Edwards Arguments in part V.I

1. Arminians say if something causally predetermines our choices, we are not responsible.
2. But responsibility is not the cause of choices, it’s in the nature of choices
3. If responsibility is in the cause of choices, we search through an infinite regression of causes, and nothing is ever responsible.

My Response
Point 1 is close, but not quite accurate. While our actions can be predetermined, our choices cannot be. Choice cannot be predetermined, else it’s not choice. Predeterminism leaves us with only one possible action, but choice requires alternatives (i.e. more than one). A “predetermined choice” is self-contradictory, implying we can choose something we can’t choose. So we think Calvinists are inconsistent for saying we can choose.

Outline of Edwards’ arguments in part V.II

1. Arminians say that without self-determining power, we have no power of action, acts are not our own, and we must be passive.
2. This isn’t the way people use “action” in common speech.
3. Used this way action is either causeless or an infinite regression of causes.
4. When we speak of a first cause, if nothing causes something, nothing could prevent it, so therefore it is necessary.
5. The common notion of action is the effects of the will.
6. Arminians think of action as self-determination, because the motion of our bodies is caused by our wills – so they assume the same applies to the motion of our wills.

Edwards’ arguments in part V.III and part V.IV

Edwards splits necessity into two categories: natural and moral. Natural necessity relates to our actions, moral necessity relates to our wills. If an act is naturally necessary, it is either against or without our will, and whether we will or not the result is the same. Edwards says that natural necessity is the common meaning of necessity and moral necessity is philosophical. Natural necessity (common necessity) is a sense wholly different than that used in the Calvinist/Arminian debate. Most people go through their whole lives without thinking about moral necessity (philosophical necessity) and its relationship with responsibility.

Libertarian Free Will (LFW) is the idea that man is able to choose otherwise than he will choose. It’s contrasted with Compatiblism Free Will (CFW), the idea that free will and determinism are compatible. These are alternative views of the will; both can’t be true about a persons’ will at the same time.

The descriptions “libertarian” and “free” distinguish LFW from CFW, but are otherwise redundant. For those holding to LFW, the will is always at liberty, and is always free, else it’s not a will. Arminius put it: “the will cannot be forced”.

This post is an excerpt from the book review of Death of Death in the Death of Christ.

2 Peter 2:1 But there were false prophets also among the people, even as there shall be false teachers among you, who privily shall bring in damnable heresies, even denying the Lord that bought them, and bring upon themselves swift destruction.

Peter is prophesying about a falling away. He speaks of false teachers who deny the Lord that bought them.

My argument is simple.

P1: Christ bought the false teachers
P2: the false teachers ultimately perish
C1: therefore Christ bought those that ultimately perish

This post is an excerpt from the book review of Death of Death in the Death of Christ.

This argument is based on Judas and the Lord's supper.

Luke 22:
17And he took the cup, and gave thanks, and said, Take this, and divide it among yourselves:
18For I say unto you, I will not drink of the fruit of the vine, until the kingdom of God shall come.
19And he took bread, and gave thanks, and brake it, and gave unto them, saying, This is my body which is given for you: this do in remembrance of me.
20Likewise also the cup after supper, saying, This cup is the new testament in my blood, which is shed for you.
21But, behold, the hand of him that betrayeth me is with me on the table.

This passage is the institution of the Lord’s supper. Christ gives the bread to the disciples (including Judas) and says that it’s given for you. My argument is simple:

This post is an excerpt from the book review of Death of Death in the Death of Christ.

There are several passages of the word of God that teach that Christ died for those that ultimately perish. These passages don't teach that Christ died for all, because they only talk about specific groups or even one individual. Never-the-less, these are powerful arguments that Christ died for all, because they disprove substantially every Calvinist argument for limited atonement.

I plan on examining three passages starting with Hebrews 10.

Hebrews 10:

26For if we sin wilfully after that we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins,
27But a certain fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries.